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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD 0. BJORK, HERMAN A. 
BJORK, BEATRICE A. WILCOX 
and ARTHUR ANDERSON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
vs. 
APRIL INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APRIL INDUSTRIES, INC. 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 14620 
Appellant is the defendant in this action. Plain-
tiffs brought suit for damages alleging defendant's breach of 
an agreement to register their shares in a public offering of 
other common shares of defendant's stock. Plaintiffs also 
sought judgment ordering defendant to issue to plaintiffs new 
stock certificates without any restrictive legend. 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
After the trial of this matter in March of 1975 
the district court ordered defendant to issue unrestricted 
certificates but refused to award plaintiffs any damages. 
From this ruling on damages plaintiffs appealed. In March 
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of this year this Court ruled that plaintiffs were entitled 
to damages for defendant's breach of the registration agree-
ment. On remand the trial court entered judgment (1) re-
quiring defendant to issue new certificates without restric-
tive legend and (2) awarding damages and accrued interest in 
the amount of $55,239.28. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits that plaintiffs are not entitled 
to the inconsistent remedies of money damages and an order 
requiring defendant to issue new stock certificates. There-
fore, defendant seeks a ruling of this Court that plaintiffs 
are not entitled to money damages. Alternatively, appellant 
requests an order requiring defendants, as a condition to the 
recovery of damages, to renounce any claim or interest in the 
shares in question. In addition, appellant seeks a ruling 
from this Court that the prejudgment interest awarded to 
plaintiffs was excessive and improper. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1969, plaintiffs, as members of 
the Board of Directors of Alta Helena Mining and Milling 
Company, issued to themselves 16,000 common shares of the 
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company's stock. 1 This issuance was made to compensate the 
plaintiffs for past services rendered to the company. The 
certificates representing ownership of these shares were 
stamped with a restrictive legend stating that the shares 
could not be freely sold or transferred. Plaintiffs also 
obligated the company to include the shares being issued to 
them in any future public offering of the company's common 
stock. This inclusion was to be at no expense to plaintiffs. 
In February of 1972 defendant offered its stock 
for sale to the public. The offering price was $13.00 per 
share. None of the shares belonging to plaintiffs were 
included in this offering. In May of 1974 plaintiffs filed 
suit because of defendant's failure to include their shares 
in the 1972 offering. 
The trial court in its original judgment entered in 
April of 1975 found that (1) the September agreement was valid 
and enforceable, that (2) the plaintiffs' shares had not been 
1. Defendant April Industries, Inc. is the successor through 
merger to Alta Helena Mining and Milling Company. As 
part of such merger transactions April Industries' common 
shares were recapitalized so that each one of the present 
April Industries shares represents 4 shares of the old 
Alta Helena Mining and Milling Company. Thus the original 
16,000 shares now represent 4,000 shares. 
-3-
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included in the offering, and that (3) the plaintiffs had 
waived any right they might have had to damages. The trial 
court then gave plaintiffs judgment and ordered defendant to 
issue to plaintiffs new stock certificates without any 
restrictive legend. 
This Court, in an opinion filed March 12, 1976, 
reversed the lower court's ruling on plaintiffs' damage 
claims and remanded the case with instructions to enter a 
money judgment for plaintiffs. Bjork, et al v. April Industries, 
547 P.2d 219 (Utah 1976). 
On May 28, 1976, the trial court entered its second 
judgment ordering defendant to issue to each of the plaintiffs 
new certificates without restrictive legend for 1,000 shares 
of defendant's common stock. In addition, each plaintiff was 
awarded judgment in the amount of $10,982.50 with interest in 
the amount of $2,827.32, for a total judgment of $55,239.28. 
(R. 11) 
The damage calculation was as follows: This Court's 
opinion held the measure of damages to be the highest price 
during the public offering less the stock's present value. 
(See 547 P.2d at 221) Plaintiffs presented evidence that the 
highest price during the offering was 12.75 dollars. (R. 8,9) Ft 
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this number was subtracted a sales commission, typical for 
transactions in stocks like defendant's, of 7%. The resulting 
figure was 11.8575 dollars per share. Plaintiffs' evidence 
also showed that the stock was worth 87 1/2 cents a share 
on March 12, 1976. (R. 5) By subtracting .875 dollars from 
11.8575 and multiplying by 1,000, the number of shares held 
by each plaintiff, a damage figure of $10,982.50 was computed. 
To this figure was added prejudgment interest of $2,827.32, 
computed at 6% from February 3, 1972, the date of the offering. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court awarded plaintiffs inconsistent 
remedies and unjustly enriched them. 
In its second judgment, the trial court awarded 
plaintiffs inconsistent remedies. Plaintiffs are to receive 
an amount in damages virtually equivalent to what they would 
have received had they sold their shares in the public offer-
ing.2 The trial court also told plaintiffs that they could 
2. Since April's stock has declined in value, the offset 
for the present value of the stock is very small. The 
present value of the stock reduced the amount of the 
judgment by only $875.00 for each plaintiff, or a total 
reduction of $3,500.00 
-5-
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keep their shares. Thus, plaintiffs are to receive the 
proceeds from the sale of their stock without actually 
selling that stock. 
In Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955), the Utah 
Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of election of remedies 
as follows: 
"The doctrine of election of remedies applies 
as a bar only where the two actions are 
inconsistent; .•. " (289 P.2d at 1049) 
In Rogers v. United Western Minerals Co., 8 Utah 
2d 1, 326 P.2d 1019 (1958), the plaintiff sued for past due 
installments under a contract for the sale of certain mining 
claims. In its complaint plaintiff sought both a reconvey-
ance of these claims and the allegedly past due amounts. 
Though the case was reversed on other grounds, the Utah 
Supreme Court explicitly stated that the plaintiff could not 
recover both a reconveyance of the claims and the past due 
amounts. Plaintiff had, so the court held, at some point to 
make an election so that it would not be awarded inconsistent 
remedies. 
In Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 19 Utah 2d 403, 
432 P.2d 37 (1967), the plaintiff brought suit on a uniform 
real estate contract for alleged delinquencies in the monthly 
-6-
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payments due under the agreement. Plaintiff's complaint 
sought both a recovery of the delinquent amounts and cancel-
lation of the contract. The Court held that these two 
remedies were inconsistent and that plaintiff at some point 
during the proceedings had to elect between them. 
A Colorado case factually very similar to the 
instant action is Thornburg v. Homestead Minerals Corpora-
tion, 513 P.2d 219 (Colo. App. 1973). Plaintiff sought 
damages against the defendant corporation and its attorneys 
for profits allegedly lost during the time when the defen-
dants refused to remove a restrictive legend from her certi-
ficates. 
The evidence showed that in February of 1969 the 
plaintiff purchased a large block of shares in the defendant 
corporation. Her certificates bore the legend "investment 
stock not subject to transfer until the 29th day of March, 
1969." On the March date plaintiff was told by the corpor-
ation's attorney, who was also its secretary, that the 
restriction could not be removed. Plaintiff then brought 
suit in Utah against the defendant corporation seeking re-
moval of the restrictive legend. Plaintiff was successful 
in this action, and on October 30, 1970, new certificates 
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were issued to her. 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff sued in Colorado 
claiming damages. During the period when her shares were 
restricted the market price for the stock was as high as 
$8.00 per share; by the time the restriction was removed, 
the price was only 55 cents a share. The trial court 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment; this rul-
ing was affirmed on appeal: 
"The defendants are correct in their con-
tention that plaintiff's election to seek 
clear title to the certificates thereafter 
estopped her from seeking damages in a sub-
sequent action for lost profits on sales 
she might have made while the transferability 
of the stock was being wrongfully withheld. 
The test of whether an election of remedies 
has been made when suit is filed under one 
theory, so as to estop a subsequent suit 
under an ultimate theory, is whether the 
relief sought is inconsistent." (513 P.2d 
at 220) (Emphasis added) 
The Thornburg opinion cited witn approval ~ 
v. Merts, 240 Ark. 1080, 405 S.W. 2d 273 (1966). In this 
Arkansas case plaintiffs sued for specific performance of 
a contract for the sale of shares of stock in the Pine 
Bluff National Bank. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in ruling 
that the plaintiffs could enforce the contract, specifically 
rejected plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled to damages 
for the decline in the value of the stock after their offer 
-8-
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to purchase had been rejected. This ruling was based on 
the general rule that one cannot recover both specific 
performance and damages. 
Both Thornburg, supra, and Merts, supra, relied 
upon Virginia Public Service Co. v. Steindler, 166 Va. 686, 
187 S.E. 353 (1936) where the Virginia Supreme Court rejected 
plaintiff's argument that he could compel the transfer of a 
stock certificate into his name and also receive damages for 
the decline in the stock's value between the time the transfer 
should have been made and the date when it was actually 
completed. As the court stated: 
"The question for decision may be thus put: 
Is the holder of a certificate of stock, 
who elects to sue in equity to compel the 
transfer of the stock to his name, after 
receiving the same together with all 
dividends accumulated during the contro-
versy, with interest thereon, and after 
selling the stock pending the litigation, 
entitled to recover of the corporation 
damages measured by the decline in the 
market value of the stock between the 
date the transfer should have been made 
and when it was actually made, when such 
decline was due to no fault of tne cor-
poration? 
Although the question is not free from 
difficulty, we think it must be answered 
in the negative .. 
By their form of action the complaintants 
have insisted that they were the equitable 
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owners of the stock as of the date it 
should have been transferred to them. 
They have demanded that they be clothed 
with all of the incidents of ownership 
as of that date, and on this theory 
they have obtained the transfer, and have 
collected all dividends on the stock, 
with interest. They have thus obtained 
every right which a stockholder has as 
of the desired time. 
But one of the incidents of ownership 
of property, which complaintants over-
looked, is that property is subject to 
depreciation as well as appreciation in 
value. This is a risk which every owner 
of property assumes. It is a risk which 
the complaintants took when they asked 
that they be placed in the position of 
owners of the stock as of August, 1931." 
(187 S.E. at 355, 356) 
The inconsistent recovery condemned in Thornburg, 
Merts, and Steindler was granted to plaintiffs by the trial 
court's judgment. The defendant must pay damages because 
plaintiffs could not sell their stock. Yet, the judgment 
also tells defendant that it must issue to plaintiffs new 
certificates for that stock. Defendant must also pay to 
plaintiffs whatever dividends may be declared; it must also 
permit plaintiffs to vote the shares. Defendant is in effect 
being told: "You are going to have to pay for those shares, 
but you are not going to be allowed to buy them. 11 3 
3. Plaintiffs' claims can be analogized to the law of sales. 
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A simple example trenchantly demonstrates the 
error of the trial court's judgment. Let us assume that 
defendant pays plaintiffs money damages and issues to them 
the new certificates. In the interim the price of plaintiffs' 
stock rises. Let us assume it once again reaches $13.00 
a share. Plaintiffs will then be able to sell their stock 
and realize a double recovery on their 1,000 shares. In the 
meantime, they will have received whatever dividends have 
been issued by the company and they will have been able to 
vote their shares. 
Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to what they 
would have received had their shares been included in 
the 1972 offering; they are seeking the equivalent of 
either (1) specific performance or (2) an action for 
the price. If they are asking for what is in effect 
specific performance, plaintiffs must obviously give 
up the ownership of their shares. The same is true 
of an action for the price. Under both the Uniform 
Commercial Code and pre-Code law an action for 
the price is only possible where the seller has 
delivered goods to the defaulting buyer or the risk 
of loss has passed from the seller to the buyer. 
See U.C.C. §2-709. A seller is not entitled to sue 
for the sales price and at the same time keep the 
goods to be sold. The obvious reason for this rule 
is to prevent the seller from being unjustly enriched 
by being paid for goods which he is going to keep. 
In Murray v. Americare Medical Designs, Inc. 123 Ga. 
App. 557, 181 S.E.2d 871 (1971), the plaintiff, who 
had supplied plans and supervised construction of a 
medical building being erected by the defendants, 
brought suit for breach of the construction agree-
ment. 
-11-
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The stock may not, of course, increase in value; 
but that is hardly the point. The real point is that plain-
tiffs will be able to hold their stock and thus speculate on 
a possible future price rise after having been paid in 
damages virtually the entire value of the shares. 
II. Plaintiffs are foreclosed from recovering 
damages because of a ruling of the trial court from which 
plaintiffs took no appeal. 
At trial in March of 1975 plaintiffs attempted on 
a highly technical theory of conversion to tender their 
On a petition for rehearing after judgment for the 
plaintiff the issue concerned the ownership of certain 
cabinets and hardware items to be placed in the build-
ing. The court found that the evidence as to the lo-
cation and ownership of the cabinets was conflicting. 
It resolved the dilemma by holding that the defendant 
would, by paying the judgment, be entitled to take 
possession of the cabinets and other hardware items. 
As the court stated: 
"It is obvious, however, that when this 
defendant pays off the judgment against 
him representing damages equivalent to 
the purchase price of the casework and 
hardware he becomes by that fact the 
owner of the merchandise and entitled to 
whatever value it may have, since to allow 
the plaintiff or the manufacturer full pay-
ment plus goods involved would result in 
an unjust enrichment. In this connection 
see Code Ann. 109A-2-709. [The Georgia 
Provision of Section 2-709 of the Uniform 
Commerical Code]." (181 S.E.2d at 873-
874) (Emphasis added) 
-12-
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shares into court and by thus renouncing any interest in 
the shares claim the entire offering price of the stock as 
damages.4 The trial court quite properly rejected this 
tender. (R.381) Plaintiffs did not appeal this ruling and 
never at any time during subsequent proceedings have they 
questioned its correctness. 
The trial court's ruling on plaintiffs' proffered 
tender is significant for two reasons. First, the ruling 
should have limited plaintiffs' recovetyto the removal of 
the restrictive legend from their certificates. Under pre-
vailing rules of appellate practice, plaintiffs' failure to 
appeal the ruling should preclude any appellate award of 
damages. Cf. In Re Jones Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 
(1940); Aiken v. Less Taylor Motor Co., 110 Utah 265, 171 P.2d 
676 (1946); Keller v. Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953); 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954). 
Second, their attempted tender shows that plaintiffs 
understood that they needed to choose the remedy they were 
4. In the prior and related case of Lowe v. April Industries, 
531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1975) the plaintiffs elected at 
trial to renounce all interest in their April shares and 
thus were able to collect damages for both conversion 
and for defendant's breach of the registration agreement. 
This election in the prior action was, unlike the instant 
case, accepted by the trial court. 
-13-
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to pursue. They understood that they could not recover 
damages equivalent to the sales price for the shares and, 
at the same time, keep those shares. It would be ironic 
to suggest that plaintiffs, having failed on their attempt 
to give up their shares, snould be able to keep those shares 
and yet recover damages because tnose shares were not sold. 
III. The lower court's judgment, in effect, 
deprives defendant of its property without due process of 
law. 
Because defendant is, in practical effect, being 
compelled to buy stock which plaintiffs' are keeping, defen-
dant is being deprived of the property for which it is paying. 
This case thus takes on the dimensions of deprivation of 
property without due process of law in violation of both the 
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, sec. 7 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Cf., e.g., Thompson 
v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624 (1960); 
Fuentes v. Shevins, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972); Snaidach 
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed. 
2d 349 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 
(1969).5 
5. Cf. the statement in Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 
-14-
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In Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 Utah 
39, 300 Pac. 1040 (1931) this Court held that a purchaser's 
cause of action for stock sold in violation of a Utah Blue 
Sky Law survived the legislature's repeal of the act. She could 
still sue after repeal because her right to sue was a vested 
property right; this right could not be taken from her by a 
judicial ruling that her claim was extinguished by the act's 
repeal. 
If defendant has to pay for plaintiffs' stock, 
it should not be deprived of that stock by the type of judi-
cial ruling condemned in Buttrey. To hold otherwise is to 
take appellant's property without due process. 
IV. The trial court's judgment awards to plaintiffs 
an excessive amount of prejudgment interest. 
405 U.S. 543, 92 S.Ct. 1113 (1972): 
"The right to enjoy property without unlawful 
deprivation, no less than the right to speak 
or the right to travel, is in truth, a 'per-
sonal' right, whether the 'property' in 
question be a welfare check, a home, or a 
savings account. In fact, a fundamental in-
terdependence exists between the personal 
right to liberty and the personal right in 
property. Neither could have meaning with-
out the other. That rights in property are 
basic civil rights has long been recognized." 
(92 s.ct. at 1122) (Citations omitted) 
-15-
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As stated, each of the plaintiffs was awarded 
$2,827.32 as prejudgment interest. This award was excessive 
because it permitted the recovery of interest computed from 
February 3, 1972, when in fact the amount of plaintiffs' 
damages was not ascertainable until March 12, 1976; any 
prejudgment interest to be awarded should only run from this 
March date and not from February of 1972. 
The Utah rule on prejudgment interest was estab-
lished in Fell v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 32 Utah 
101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907). The case involved plaintiff's 
claim that livestock being shipped by him on defendant's 
railroad either died or lost weight because of a delay in 
shipment. 
The trial court allowed plaintiff interest from 
the time when he first made demand on the defendant for 
the claimed damages. The Supreme Court held that the award 
of such interest was proper. In doing so it laid down the 
following test for determining the propriety of prejudgment 
interest: 
"The true test to be applied as to whether 
~ntere~t should be allowed before judgment 
in a given case or not is, therefore, not 
whether the damages are unliquidated or 
otherwise, but whether the injury and con-
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sequent damages are complete and must be 
ascertained as of a particular time and 
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence 
and known standards of value, which the 
court or jury must follow in fixing the 
amount, rather than be guided by their 
best judgment in assessing the amount to 
be allowed for past as well as for future 
injury, or for elements that cannot be 
measured by any fixed standards of value. 
The same rule under the same conditions 
would of necessity apply to actions for 
breach of contract." 88 Pac. at 1007 
(Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently cited with 
approval the quoted language from Fell in Utah Pipeline 
Corporation v. White Superior Company, 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 
1976). In this recent case the Utah Supreme Court held 
that prejudgment interest was measurable from the date of 
the destruction of the compressor, because its value was 
clearly ascertainable as of that date. See also Gillespie 
v. Blood, 81 Utah 306, 17 P.2d 822 (1932); St. Joseph Stock 
Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 P. 305 (1921). 
This Court's opinion on the first appeal awarded 
plaintiffs damages for the "difference between the present 
market value and the highest price obtainable during the 
period of the breach which we perceive would be the highest 
price reached during the public offering less sales cost." 
(547 P.2d at 221) In its reference to "present market value," 
-17-
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the Court presumably meant March 12, 1976, the opinion's 
date. Thus, plaintiffs' damages were calculated by sub-
tracting the value of the stock on March 12, 1976, from the 
value on the date of the February, 1972, public offering. 
Thus, the damage computation was not complete, final and 
fixed until March 12, 1976, and under the rule of Fell the 
earliest date from which interest could be allowed would be 
March 12, 1976. 
The choice of the March 12th date is critical to 
the amount of both damages and of prejudgment interest. 
If, fo~ example, the value of the April Industries stock 
had been more than 87 1/2 cents on March 12, 1976, the 
plaintiffs' judgment would be less and the prejudgment in-
terest would be correspondingly reduced. If damages were 
being measured from any date other than March 12, 1976, 
both the damages and the amount of any permissible prejudg-
ment interest would be different. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief appellant 
April Industries, Inc., respectfully submits that this Court 
should reverse the lower court's judgment and remand this 
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case with instructions that plaintiffs be awarded no money 
damages. Alternatively, appellant would request that this 
Court reverse the lower court's judgment with instructions 
that plaintiffs be required to renounce any claim or inter-
est which they have in their stock as a condition to the 
recovery of damages. Finally, appellant seeks a ruling of 
this Court that the award of prejudgment interest from 
February 3, 1972, was erroneous. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Kenneth W. Yeates 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
April Industries, Inc. 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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